

3 Theoretical Interlude (II)

The question of development styles

Ideological alternatives do exist in the social, economic and political fields and therefore it is possible to choose—at least for the holders of power—between different development styles. However, if our considerations also take into account the concern for the environmental problem—which, rather than adding a new element, involves the statement of an essentially new problem—it should be recognized that up to now only one style has been predominant: the vandalic style. In other words, alternatives exist at a limited level, characteristic of the orthodox analytical scheme. For an overall statement of the biospheric *problematique*, theoretical alternatives of great interest and value have been proposed, but none have so far been put into practice on a national or global scale.¹² I intend to demonstrate this point of view.

There is a form of opinion—perhaps the most widespread—which considers the potential biospheric crisis in general, and the ecological aspects in particular, as additional elements to be taken into account in development planning. In other words, it is simply a question of considering one or more additional variables and parameters in order to perfect a model. If this was so, it would then be perfectly logical and natural to conceive as possible an ecological capitalism or corporate liberalism, an ecological socialism, an ecological conservatism or finally, any other equally ecological and eclectic mixture or corn

ination. It is these very possibilities that I consider illusory. I believe that, for various reasons which I shall explain later, the forms of socio-economic and political organization currently in force in the world are essentially antagonistic to the achievement of a tripartite harmony between Nature, Humans, and Technology. But before I continue to explore a field which I recognise is a sensitive one, I would like to make some disquisitions 'in the form of recapitulation.

I believe that I have made the extent of the anthropocentric attitude sufficiently clear and also that I have demonstrated that its origin lies in the very basis of our Western culture and that, therefore, it is a common factor in all dominant political philosophies or ideologies to date.* It is therefore the product of a 'final cause' which, in consequence, cannot be solved by including corrective factors in schemes or models whose incompleteness is the result of 'efficient causes'. In other words, a development model may be perfected in formal terms as far as is desired, but modifications of cultural foundations—regarded as unfavourable—transcend any possibility of formalization, and are possible only as the product of a deep structural revolution capable of altering, or substituting for others, some dominant ontological characters. Assuming this is a plausible argument, I should state in sum that if anthropocentric behaviour originates in 'final causes', and the ineffectiveness of ideologies, as well as of the socio-political and economic organizations emanating from them, originates in 'efficient causes'; then any attempt to modify or perfect the latter which has not previously achieved a radical reorientation of the former, will be in vain.

The necessary advent of a kind of ecological humanism, capable of substituting, or at least correcting, the anthropocentrism still dominant among us, is certainly so revolutionary a prospect that there is no way it could merely be included as a simple element in a development plan, however ambitious and sophisticated that plan may be. But let me return now to the proposal.

* Philosophical anarchism may be the only exception so far. I shall refer to it later on in this chapter.

I have maintained the view that the systems currently in force are not compatible with the integral solution of the problem which I have posed. This view has been based on the fact that all of them, in their constitution and content, flow from a common cultural matrix which, because of its characteristics, has impelled them—despite their differences and divergencies in other respects—in a way contrary to that which a state of dynamic balance between Nature, Humanity and Technology would require or rather demand. This might appear to be sufficient argument to justify an overall critical revision. But there are still testimonies for those who, rejecting the validity of my thesis of 'final causes', hold on to the belief that the solution being sought lies only in the mechanistic possibility of correcting errors ('side effects of bad house-keeping' as Ferkiss so aptly calls them) within systems recognized as basically good and positive. I must therefore enter into the second stage of my critical incursion, which consists of drawing attention to the way in which each individual system is affected, no longer only by an adverse 'final cause' common to all, but also by 'efficient causes', equally adverse and equally common to all.

If the 'final cause'—as already stated—is responsible for anthropocentrism, the latter is in turn responsible—via the ideologies—for the form which socio-political and economic systems have assumed. This is as far as the concatenation of the 'final cause' goes. What follows is that development styles, or rather the concrete methodologies which each system has designed to solve its problems in accordance with its ultimate purposes, turn into 'efficient causes'—the results of which can be individualized and, usually, measured. Development styles turn into programmed forces which, when put into movement, generate processes identifiable in space and time.

Thus, due to the fact that the end product of the development styles in their capacity as 'efficient causes' are usually conspicuous and that it is possible to single them out in temporal terms, as well as in terms of location and magnitude, the belief has spread that by solving case by case, or by avoiding proliferation of new cases through new technological as well as legislative measures, the overall problem will sooner or later reach a solution. The thesis that I sustain

does not admit such a possibility, as the aspects in which current development styles *differ* markedly from one another are neutral with respect to the environment, while those aspects that are *common* to all—to a greater or lesser degree—are precisely those which are environmentally adverse. But, and this is *even* more crucial, the degree of importance assumed by these common factors within each individual system is such that the effect of altering them would be equivalent to a complete reformulation of each system. In other words, the drastic correction of 'efficient causes' of the environmental problem within a capitalist system—to take one example—would represent the end of what defines the capitalist system. It would not be a reformed capitalism, it would be something entirely different. The same, of course, is true for the other existing systems.

There are more environmentally adverse common elements than I could analyse within this chapter. I have therefore decided to select only two, which are important enough, however, to illustrate my point of view. I will refer to the problem of mechanicism and to some questions of magnitude. But first I should point out that, although not every system will be affected with the same intensity by each point to be mentioned, all of them are vulnerable to a greater or lesser degree, according to the point in question.

The problem of mechanicism

Each system has generated its own economic theory. But 'the whole truth is that economics, in the way this discipline is now generally professed, is mechanistic in the same strong sense in which we generally believe only classical mechanics to be'.¹³ Once economists became obsessed with the need to promote their discipline to the category of science, they made every possible effort to assimilate it to patterns pertaining to the physics of the times. This is borne out by the works of Jevons (1835-1882) and of Walras (1834-1910)—English and French respectively—who tried to find analogies with classical mechanics. Irving Fisher himself (1867-1947), as all economists know, was involved in an effort worthy of a Swiss watchmaker, when he completed the construction of a particularly ingenious and intricate

device, the purpose of which was to demonstrate the purely mechanical nature of consumer behaviour. The Law of Say (1767-1832), which has had such an important influence on liberal economic thinking ('production generates its own purchasing power'), is equally mechanistic. The notion of 'Homo Oeconomicus' is undeniably so and, finally, Marx's diagrams of economic reproduction—which have already been mentioned—are bound by the same limitation.

This trend would not present any problem whatsoever if economic processes really were mechanical. Of course many economists still seem to believe that they are, and the economic policies they advocate are proof of this. After all, a characteristic displayed by many economists engaged in policy-making, is their talent to withdraw from reality, which causes havoc among those who live in it. But the fact is that economic processes—susceptible to mechanical interpretations in isolated cases—are of an entropic nature in their broader and more generalized trend.*

Contrary to what is stated in textbooks, the last link of the economic process is not consumption but the generation of waste. This means a transformation of low into high entropy, a process which, although inevitable, is at least susceptible to being slowed down. This is a point many economists still refuse to recognize: the fact that

* The concept of entropy stems from the Second Law of Thermodynamics which, in its simplest formulation, establishes that heat always flows in one direction, that is, from the hotter to the colder body. Because this process is unidirectional in addition to being irreversible, it proved the existence of processes that could not be explained in mechanical terms. In this sense it should be remembered that a mechanical phenomenon is such as long as it is reversible. As a result, entropic processes can only be described by methods that are alien to mechanics (concretely through thermodynamic equations). Entropy reveals that which in other terms is usually identified as an irrevocable trend toward the degradation of energy contained in a closed system; a situation which reaches its peak when the energy of all the systems' components is equalised, the former thus becoming incapable—as is even intuitively evident—of altering its final state, except for endogenous stimuli. In the language of physics, the state of maximum entropy is a synonym of chaos, or of absolute disorder (which is the same, as order is understood as the product of diversity). Ultimately, the important thing to keep in mind is the notion of irreversibility in opposition to mechanical processes.

since the product of economic processes is waste, waste is an inevitable result of that process and *ceteris paribus* increases in greater proportion than the (creative) intensity of economic activity'.¹⁴ Hyperurbanization and the increasing pollution that is concomitant with those centres considered to be the most highly developed, is proof; proof that came as an unexpected and disconcerting surprise for all economic theories. One should ask how to reconcile the product of 'efficiency' supported by all economic theories with the resulting environmental disaster.

Because economics never assigned the natural environment—a system affected by entropy—its real weight, it was possible for the discipline to remain enclosed within its mechanistic ivory tower up to the day of the truth. Economics has thus become a discipline (or science if you wish) as unhistoric as any mechanical process: only that which is irreversible represents the emergence of an authentic novelty; only the irreversible, in its purest sense, is a true event.* The mechanical is no more than the possibility of repetition. Economics is prepared to play elegantly with the latter but remains, to a great extent, deprived of arguments and tools with which to tackle what is truly new.

It is strangely moving to observe the persistent efforts of so many economists to promote their field to the category of a science devoid of contradictions, while physics—the inspiration of the economic mechanism—gave up this pretence over fifty years ago. Just as the 'Principle of Complementarity' of Niels Bohr (1885-1962) emerged from the inescapable necessity of having to accept that the electron may sometimes behave as a wave and sometimes as a particle—forms of mutually incompatible behaviour—so economic theories should be prepared to accept the co-existence of mechanical and entropic processes which also seem to contradict one another.

The curious thing is, however, that economics originated, without its creators realizing it, in an entropic notion: scarcity. It is evident that 'if the entropic process were not irrevocable, that is, if the energy

* A person in love can perhaps understand the truth of this statement better than an economist, unless they are an economist in love.

of a piece of coal or of uranium could be used over and over again *ad infinitum*, scarcity would hardly exist in man's life. Up to a certain level, even an increase in population would not create scarcity: mankind would simply have to use the existing stocks more frequently'.¹⁵ Yet, scarcity exists because entropic processes are irrevocable. To the extent that economists are unwilling to accept the crisis affecting the foundations of economic theories in order to undertake their reconstruction, any hope that they will contribute positively to the adequate interpretation and eventual solution of biospheric problems is extremely thin.

Finally, there is an additional aspect which I would like to stress. Economic processes, especially those generated by the corporate liberal establishment, increase worldwide entropy at a frightening pace. The generation of increasingly large amounts of unnecessary waste is sealing the fate—destitute poverty—of the world's economically 'invisible' sectors. This means that those economic theories which give theoretical support to corporate liberal actions are not only wrong on technical grounds, but also on moral grounds.

On questions of magnitude

Aristotle sustained the view that a great city should not be confounded with a populous one, and went as far as to propose that the best limit to the population of a state is the largest number which can be taken in at a single view. Such a notion may appear absurd to thinkers and the general public today, who have become accustomed to confusing greatness and efficiency with giantism. However, in view of the new problems affecting humanity, it does not seem sensible to reject, without a second look, any possibility of meditating anew on notions that were discarded in the course of the evolution of thought and history. Our present situation has no analogies in the past. It is not the result of a continuous extrapolation. There are entirely new circumstances which oblige us to seek inspiration in all sources of human knowledge and experience. What is antiquated—in this case—is not so because it is old, but because it is obsolete. Thus contemporary concepts (such as mechanistic econo-

mics, already discussed) should also be discarded because of their obsolescence, while proposals from the dim past may reappear surprisingly rejuvenated and relevant. Aristotle's observations, which I have just cited, appear to me justly pertinent. In fact, in the 'Theoretical Interlude' of the second part of this book (see p. 129), I have amply developed the ideas of Aristotle and others, with reference to the size of systems, especially urban systems and their environments. Therefore, I shall devote this section to comments on other questions that relate to problems of magnitude.

It has long been believed that economic growth was good for mankind, which is of course true. The problem emerged when 'good' became a synonym for 'more and more'. In the end this obsession generated a new concept of social justice, especially under capitalism. Social justice became confused with growth itself. It is no longer a question of better distributing a cake which is already big enough, so that those who have less will receive a larger proportion. On the contrary, it is now a question of making a yet larger cake so that all will receive a greater portion than before, but keep the same proportion assigned to them by the system. Of course, in reality what tends to happen is that, even with growth, the poor's share of the cake diminishes. Growing evidence of this does not seem to have affected the behaviour of these economic systems or of the theories behind them. There is still insistence to the effect that processes such as the so-called 'trickle-down effect' work, despite some overwhelming evidence to the contrary, especially in many Third World countries.

The above concept (being especially typical of capitalism, mainly in its guise of corporate liberalism) affects, to a degree, other systems as well. Third World countries, with a few exceptions, are fascinated by the temptation of following the road traced by the large industrial powers, forgetting that the only way to achieve and secure their identity and decrease their dependence, lies in promoting a creative and imaginative spirit capable of generating alternative development processes that may secure higher degrees of regional and local self-reliance.

The question of magnitude turns into an apotheosis of stupidity when applied to the proliferation of armaments: surely the fastest and

greatest generator of high entropy in the world today. The fact that the present accumulated explosive power in the world is equivalent to three tons of dynamite for every living person is so incredible that it can only be explained with the assumption that some influential sage must have demonstrated that it is possible to kill the same person over and over again.

The question of great magnitude has also caused conceptual havoc in other areas; most tangibly in the area that refers to the so-called demographic problem. To this I want to refer at some length. The arguments and warnings on this subject are well known and need no repetition here. However, I do wish to draw attention to a situation which I believe to be dangerously misleading.

Population is usually considered as a quantitative component with an absolute value when making projections related to the resources capable of sustaining it. Many works have been carried out with the purpose of detecting the total population that the earth could presumably sustain. There are those who believe that the total could be as many as fifty thousand million, and others who do not dare go beyond one tenth of that magnitude. All of this appears to me as nothing more than irrelevant speculation which leads nowhere because it ignores a fundamental fact. Demographic expansion, if related to the availability of resources—actual or potential—cannot, and must not, be dealt with in absolute terms, but only in relative terms. To speak of one hundred million people means nothing; to speak of one hundred million U.S. Americans or one hundred million people in India, means everything.

What I am aiming at is this: one hundred million U.S. Americans, measured in terms of the natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable) they draw upon, are equivalent to many thousands of millions of Indians. Thus, in ecological terms, it would be perfectly legitimate to state that the relatively more over-populated nations are, in fact, the richest and not the poorest. In global terms, a drastic decrease of population in the poorest areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, would make an impact immeasurably smaller than a decrease of only 5 per cent in present consumption levels of the ten richest countries of the world. When one thinks in these terms, it is easy to

grasp the absurdity and weak rationality of arguments against helping the poor except, of course, those countries who are 'really' carrying out efforts to decrease their rates of population growth.¹⁶

All this leads me to believe that a new statistical quantifier should be developed in demography. I propose a measure which I would call 'ecological person' ('ecoson' for short). The idea is to establish an approximate scale of the rational drainage of resources needed for a person to attain an acceptable quality of life. I realize that subjective aspects are involved here, but they are involved in many other quantifiers in regular use. In any case, it is not an insoluble problem. It is not difficult to establish such a scale in terms of nutritional requirements, clothing and housing. As a matter of fact, commodity packages have been calculated for many purposes, and it would simply be a matter of following a similar line in order to establish the direct and indirect resource drainages required by one 'ecoson'. If such a statistical objective were achieved, it would be interesting to calculate for the first time, by regions or countries, the number of 'ecosons' composing the different populations. It would not be surprising, for example, to discover that one inhabitant of the United States was equivalent to fifty 'ecosons', and that a single inhabitant of India or Togo was no more than a fraction of an 'ecoson'. I would even dare predict that if we measured world population in terms of 'ecosons', we would find that the world is already weighed down with nearly fifty thousand million, of which the highest proportion would be found in a few of the richest countries. In addition, if we consider that, within my thesis, the proportion by which the population of 'ecosons' exceeds that of the absolute population will be a concrete measure of the amount of 'waste surplus',* we would finally have a clear notion of the destructive magnitude of the problem caused by the worship of giant dimensions. I believe that my proposal would not only enable us to see the problem in its true perspective, but

* By 'waste surplus' of a population I mean the amount of waste resulting from consumption levels higher than those that would be required by a population if measured in terms of 'ecosons'.

would also be so illuminating a statistical illustration that it could act as a persuasion to implement more humanistic international policies. I am still confident that something can be done, despite the fact that the dominant processes at work do not seem to care in the least about the 'invisible' sectors of the world, except when it comes to accusing them of being burdens that should be treated as expendable.

So, what should be done?

I hope I have shown, satisfactorily, the crisis of foundations that affects us all in different respects. It would now be appropriate to indicate a course of action, although this is, to a large degree, implicit in my previous arguments. It will become explicit in the following chapters, where I relate the concrete field experiences through which I have tried to put my ideas into practice. However, I would like to make some additional disquisitions.

It seems to me that, in view of the overall crisis we are going through, *we* find ourselves once again before 'the beginning of Utopia'. The search for Utopia is not simply the search for a society that is possible, but for a society that is, from a humanist perspective, desirable. The notion of Utopia—or of eutopia, as I prefer to call it—is rich, because it transcends the forms of crumbling eclecticism within which the present search for solutions is carried out. Transactions and partial solutions are no longer of any use. In fact, they are misleading; to pollute or to mislead people a little less is not the equivalent of living a little better or dying a little less. Like a bridge spanning three quarters of a river, they don't get you to the other bank.

The kind of development in which I believe and which I seek, implies an integral ecological humanism. None of the present systems provides for this, nor has the capacity to correct itself (in order to provide it) without losing the essence of its identity as a result. And since I do not believe that any of the existing systems will work itself out of business, I have ceased to believe in the value of corrective measures. It is no longer a question of correcting what already exists. That opportunity was lost long ago. It is no longer a question of

adding new variables to old mechanistic models. It is a question of remaking many things from scratch and of conceiving radically different possibilities. It is a question of understanding that, if it is the role of humans to establish values, then it is the role of nature to establish many of the rules. It is a matter of passing from the pure exploitation of nature and of the poorer people of the world, to a creative and organic integration and interdependence. It is a matter of bringing the 'invisible' sectors into the forefront of life and of letting them, finally, have their say and 'do their thing'. It is a matter of a drastic redistribution of power through the organization of horizontal communal integration. It is a matter of passing from destructive giantism to creative smallness.

Such an eutopic society, which I conceive as oriented by a political philosophy which I would identify (for the sake of giving it a name) as 'humanist eco-anarchism', consolidates, in my opinion, many of the possibilities for an adequate solution of the problem. But there can be nothing definite or permanent about even this attempt, for there lies a future beyond the future I can conceive, and that future could well place us at a new crossroads where everything would once more have to be rethought and reconstructed. But at this stage *we* cannot preoccupy ourselves with concerns not yet conceived. We have more than enough to do with the challenges facing us right now. Let it simply be stated that I personally do not believe in any type of permanent solution. My proposal is geared to current conditions only; long-term flexibility and the willingness to change is built into my philosophy.

My philosophy is ecological in the sense that it is based on the conviction that human beings, in order to realize themselves, must maintain a relationship of interdependence and not of competition with nature and the rest of mankind, and equally that this must be a conscious relationship, because the ecological perspective projected on the natural environment provides fertile analogies for social ordering. It is a humanistic philosophy in that it maintains that humans are self-conscious and carry out their relationships with nature and with other human beings through culture. It also states that ecological balance cannot be left to automatism, but must be subject to human

knowledge, judgement and will, in terms of conscious political action. Finally, it is anarchistic, not in the vulgar sense, but in as much as it is based on the conviction that every form of concentration of power (and all the present systems lead to this) alienates people from their environment—both natural and human—and limits or annuls their direct participation and sense of responsibility, restricting their imagination, information, communication, critical capacity and creativity. These last conditions I consider essential for the realization of the two preceding conditions: that is, an ecological conscience supported by humanistic behaviour.¹⁷

My beliefs are strongly held, so I have tried to put them into practice and live according to them. The story that follows reveals my own experience of working and living within the 'invisible' sector. It is a major experiment in the participation of and between horizontally interdependent communities that contained altogether more than one hundred thousand economically 'invisible' people. It was such a successful experiment that it failed; the traditional holders of power became afraid of it. Yet it proved to me that it can be done and, above all, that it must be done.

Notes

1. See Moberg, Vilhelm, *A History of the Swedish People*, P.A. Norstedt & Söners Stockholm, 1970, Vol. I, p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. Genesis, Chapter , verse 28. (The italics are mine.)
5. See Ferkiss, Victor, *The Future of Technological Civilization*, George Braziller, New York, 1974, p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 68.
7. Engels, Eriedrich, *Dialectics of Nature*, Inte^rnational Publishers, New York, 1940, pp. 291-292.
8. Ferkiss, Victor, op. cit., p. 68.
9. Georgescu-Roegen, N., *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, p. 2.
10. Georgescu-Roegen, N., op. cit., p. 2.
11. Ferkiss, Victor, op. cit., p. 63.
12. Some of the most interesting proposals are contained io *What Now: Another Development, The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Cooperation*. The Dag Hammarskjöld Eoundation, Uppsala, 1975.
27. Georgescu-Roegen, N., op. cit., p. 1.
28. Georgescu-Roegen, N., op. cit., p. 19.
29. Georgescu-Roegen, N., op. cit., p. 6.
30. Hardin, Garret, 'Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor', *Psychology Today*, 8, 1974. For good criticism of Hardin's ideas see Bay, Christian, 'Toward a World of Natural Communities', *Alternatives* No. 4, Spring, 1981.
31. For the first two points I llave taken ideas from Ferkiss, because I identified with them oven before reading him. I have added the third aspect (which he ignores as do most) for reasons that I consider quite obvious. I have added it because I consider it logical and essential to consolidate the factual possibility of the other two. No form of humanism makes any cense to me without a drastic redistribution of power.
13. The detailed information of this history has been taken from Julio Estrada Ycaza, *Regionalismo y Migración*, Publicaciones del Archivo Histórico de Guayas, Guayaquil, Ecuador, 1977.
14. Juan Mangache mace bis second visit to Quito in 1598, accompanied by bis two sons, Pedro and Domingo, who were painted. Their portrait is to be seen in the Archaeological Museum of Madrid.
15. The quotation has been taken from the first chapter of Ma^fshall Wolfe's Elusive *Development*, published in 1982 by the UN Reserarch I nstitute for Social Development and the Economic Commission for Latin America.
16. Ibid.
17. Eduardo Ribeiro de Carvalho died in 1979, in bis early fifties. His untimely death represented an irreparable loss tu all those who, under bis stimulus, were allowed tu advance and promote the most audacious and innovative ideas, something rarely found in international organizations.
18. Tiradentes means literally `Toothpuller'. It was the nickname of Joaquim José de Silva Xavier, leader of the first independence attempt in Braza, in the late eighteenth century. The attempt was known as the 'Inconfidencia Mineira'. Tiradcntes was executed ih Ouro Preto alter the movement was crushed. His bode was dismembered and the head and limbs were exhibited in the main towns of the arca as a warning tu the population. I le was born Glose tu the town that today bears bis nickname.
19. In this respect, a fundamental contribution has been nade by Tibor Scitovsky in *The Joyless Economy*, Oxford University Press, 1976. He does not concern himself with the problem of size as I do here, but he does 'look deep into the consumer's soul'.
20. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1326a and 1326b.
21. Plato, *The Republic*, 423b.
22. See Valaskakis, K., et al., *The Conserver Society*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1979.
23. Bent Sorensen, *Energy and Resources, Science*, Vol. 189, No. 4.199, July, 1975, pp. 255-260.
24. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Proposition 2.012, fourth phrase.
25. Ibid., Proposition 2.013. (The italics are mine.) I agree with Wittgenstein that we can *imagine* an empty space, although with some difficulty, since some form of object will tend tu appear as a boundary or limit of that imagined empty space. However, we can certainly *not perceive* an empty space.

31. Robert Ornstein, *On the Experience of Time*, Penguin Books, New York, 1975, pp. 21-22.
32. Léniz and Alcaíno's paper was presented at the Seminar on 'Time, Quality of Life and Social Development', Bariloche, Argentina, October, 1980.
33. The embryonic theory that I am presenting here was greatly inspired by this dramatic paragraph of Kafka's.
34. Tiradentes is located at the base of the Sao José Sierra which is a haven of spectacular and rare flora as well as interesting fauna. It has been, and still is, in constant danger of depletion and destruction. Some species have already vanished. Tiradentes itself contains an invaluable colonial cultural heritage, in spite of its long abandonment, deterioration and decay.
35. For an interesting exposition of the idea that follows, see Michael Todaro, *City Bias and Rural Neglect*, The Population Council, New York, 1981.
36. See *IFDA Dossier 17*, International Foundation for Development Alternatives, May/June, 1980, pp. 11-13 and *Development Dialogue* 1981:1.
37. The Foundation contributed to the financing of the Third Latin American Meeting on Research and Human Needs, sponsored by UNESCO, in Tiradentes in October, 1979. Although I was coordinator of the meeting, it was not properly an action of the Project.
38. They were: Fernando Rocha Pina Sampaio, painter; Vania Lima Barbosa, economist; Olinto Rodrigues dos Santos Filho, regional historian; Ann Mary Fighiera Perpetuo, secretary; Edson dos Santos, office boy. Their ages ranged from 19 to 28 years.
39. Norma Nasser and Ademar Salomao. A II the information and data that follows about children has been taken from a preliminary (unpublished) version of her paper 'Visoes da Infancia; o Caso de Tiradentes'. This version was produced in 1980.
40. It was the Third Latin American Meeting on Research and Human Needs, sponsored by UNESCO and carried out in Tiradentes in October, 1979. The subject of the meeting of that year was 'Human Needs and Childhood', hence the presentation of our research on that occasion.
41. Exactly the opposite had been the finding of Eleonora Masini who had studied children in small towns of Italy. Her research was contained in her paper 'The role of childhood in different development styles', presented at the Seminar mentioned in notes 37 and 40.